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ABSTRACT 
We examine the impact of bundling strategies on the level of consumer 
participation and premium rates realized in an individual health insurance 
market characterized by an adverse selection problem. In this context we show 
that society may use private insurers to attain universal coverage at equitable 
premiums under a pure bundling strategy, where insurers offer only a 
comprehensive policy to the market. This result is strengthened as the number of 
medical conditions covered in the comprehensive policy increases and as 
applicant risk aversion increases. When insurance applicants exhibit low levels 
of risk aversion a mixed bundling strategy (or offering single-disease policies 
along with the comprehensive policy) improves consumer participation and 
decreases premium rates when compared to a pure bundling strategy. In this 
case market performance is improved by increasing policy options offered to 
applicants. Alternatively, when insurance applicants exhibit moderate levels of 
risk aversion a mixed bundling strategy reduces consumer participation and 
increases premium rates when compared to a pure bundling strategy. In this case 
market performance is improved by reducing policy options offered to 
applicants. In addition, when insurance applicants exhibit sufficiently high levels 
of risk aversion the consumer participation and premium rates realized under a 
pure bundling strategy and mixed bundling strategy converge toward full market 
participation. Finally, under all levels of risk aversion we show that offering an 
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INTRODUCTION 
As technological advances continue to 
improve individuals’ assessments of their 
personal health risk factors, privacy legislation 
continues to restrict insurers’ use of such 
information to design insurance policies. 
Advances in biological research and medical 
technology, through the advent of genetic 
testing, have provided individuals and their 
doctors with more accurate assessments of 
their genetic predisposition for a large and 
growing number of medical conditions (Murry, 
Wimbush, and Dalton 2001). Applicants may 
use this genetic information to purchase the 
most advantageous health insurance policy 
available to them in terms of premium rates 
and coverage levels. Alternatively, insurance 
companies able to access this information may 
engage in genetic discrimination, the practice 
of denying coverage to, or pricing policies for, 
individuals based on their genetic 
predispositions to certain medical conditions 
(Gostin 1991). However, industry regulators, 
consumer advocates, ethicists, and others argue 
that genetic discrimination is unfair to 
applicants who have inherited a genetic 
predisposition over which they have no 
control. Therefore, regulators at both the state 
and federal levels have implemented genetic 
privacy legislation that prohibits the 
discriminatory use of genetic information (e.g., 
genetic test results, family history, and medical 
history) by insurance companies (Baderian and 
Selzer 2001). 
The information asymmetries created 
by these technological and regulatory trends 
may create an adverse selection problem in the 
individual health insurance market in which 
fewer individuals are covered by health 
insurance. In previous work we have shown 
that genetic privacy legislation will force lower 
risk individuals, who are no longer able to 
signal their low risk status to insurers and 
receive preferential policies, to obtain less 
coverage than they would in the absence of 
regulatory interference, while higher risk 
individuals continue to pay premiums that are 
not significantly better than they would have 
been without regulation. Essentially, no one is 
made better off under genetic privacy 
legislation, while some individuals are 
demonstrably made worse off (Clemons and 
Thatcher 1997; Thatcher 1998). In order to 
sustain the viability of the insurance market 
insurers must design a menu of insurance 
policy options to mitigate this adverse 
selection problem and to restore consumer 
participation at affordable premiums. 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper makes a contribution to IS 
research in several ways.  It contributes to 
our understanding of the economic impacts 
of the adverse selection problem created by 
recent technological and regulatory trends in 
the individual health insurance market.  It 
also contributes to our understanding of the 
economics of bundling in this context, which 
has not yet been explored in the literature.  
Specifically, the model presented in this 
paper examines the use of bundling 
strategies by a regulated insurance company 
to maximize consumer participation in the 
individual health insurance market at 
affordable premiums.  In this context 
marginal costs are high and vary discretely 
across insureds based on each insured’s 
personal health risk factors.  Counter to 
typical results in previous work, we show 
that, under certain conditions, a pure 
bundling strategy may dominate mixed 
bundling strategies.  That is, providing health 
insurance applicants with more insurance 
choices and policy options may actually 
reduce individual and social welfare.  In 
addition, this is the first economic analysis to 
our knowledge that models an insurance 
market using a repeated Cournot game not 
only to derive market equilibrium but also to 
characterize the market dynamics leading to 
equilibrium. 
This research is expected to be 
interesting to researchers focusing on the 
economic impacts of information 
technology, the social costs of information 
privacy, bundling economics, and insurance 
economics.  It is also expected to be 
interesting to managers in, and government 
regulators of, the individual health insurance 
market as they attempt to balance the genetic 
privacy of health insurance applicants with 
the availability and affordability of health 
coverage. 
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In this paper we are principally 
concerned with designing bundling strategies 
that will reduce adverse selection in the 
presence of information asymmetries and 
increase consumer participation (the 
percentage of conditions covered in the 
market) and market participation (the 
percentage of outcome risk covered in the 
market) in the context of the individual health 
insurance market. The goal of maximizing 
market participation is critical to public health 
officials and market regulators given the 
participation externalities caused by failure to 
treat communicable diseases, resulting in their 
transmission, or incomplete treatment, the 
principal driver for the development of drug-
resistant strains of super-bug (see Clemons and 
Thatcher 1997, 2000; and Thatcher 1998 for a 
more detailed discussion of market 
participation as a measure of market 
efficiency). 
We develop a model that assumes that 
applicants for individual health insurance are 
at risk for a large number of medical 
conditions, predictive genetic tests enable them 
to know their genetic predisposition to each 
condition, and regulatory policy prohibits 
insurance companies from engaging in genetic 
discrimination. Insurers may offer a set (or 
menu) of insurance policies, provided this 
same set is made available to all applicants at 
the same price. This menu may include a 
comprehensive policy (with full coverage), an 
exclusion policy (with a coverage for a single 
specified medical condition omitted from the 
coverage provided by the comprehensive 
policy), and a selection of single disease 
policies (with each policy providing coverage 
for a single medical condition). Under a 
component selling strategy the insurer offers a 
selection of single disease policies to the 
market; consumers may create their own 
customized bundles by purchasing any 
combination of policies or purchase nothing at 
all. Under a pure bundling strategy the insurer 
offers only a comprehensive policy to the 
market; consumers may purchase the 
comprehensive policy or nothing at all. Under 
a mixed bundling strategy the insurer offers a 
comprehensive policy and a selection of single 
disease policies to the market simultaneously; 
consumers may purchase the comprehensive 
policy, a customized bundle of single disease 
policies, or nothing at all. Finally, under what 
we term an exclusion strategy the insurer 
offers a comprehensive policy and an 
exclusion policy to the market simultaneously; 
consumers may purchase one of the policies or 
nothing at all. We examine the impact of each 
menu design on the purchasing decisions made 
by applicants, the premium rates charged by 
insurers, and the consumer participation 
realized in the market over a range of risk 
aversion levels. We model this problem as a 
repeated Cournot game and solve it through 
iterative numerical computation of the Nash 
equilibrium using the best response dynamic. 
Since the number of distinct populations is 
finite, equilibrium is reached in our repeated 
Cournot game in a finite number of moves. 
Significantly, although we use numerical 
methods, our solution represents an exact 
equilibrium and it is not a numerical 
approximation. Critical findings are 
summarized below: 
 Insurers may attain universal coverage at 
equitable premiums under a pure bundling 
strategy. This result is strengthened as the 
number of medical conditions covered in 
the comprehensive policy increases and as 
applicant risk aversion increases. 
 When insurance applicants exhibit low 
levels of risk aversion a mixed bundling 
strategy improves consumer participation 
and decreases premium rates when 
compared to a pure bundling strategy. In 
this context market performance is 
improved by increasing policy options 
offered to applicants.  
 Alternatively, when insurance applicants 
exhibit moderate levels of risk aversion a 
mixed bundling strategy reduces consumer 
participation and increases premium rates 
when compared to a pure bundling 
strategy. In this context market 
performance is improved by reducing 
policy options offered to applicants. 
 In addition, when insurance applicants 
exhibit sufficiently high levels of risk 
aversion the consumer participation 
realized under a pure bundling strategy 
and a mixed bundling strategy converge 
toward full market participation and the 
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premium for the comprehensive policy 
converges to the actuarially fair rate for 
the applicant population.  
 Finally, under all levels of risk aversion an 
exclusion strategy decreases consumer 
participation when compared to a pure 
bundling strategy.  
This analysis contributes to our 
understanding of the economics of bundling in 
a context not explored in previous work. 
Previous work has focused on the use of 
bundling strategies by multiple-product 
monopolists to maximize profits. Much of the 
work in the information technology (IT) 
literature has focused on the bundling of digital 
goods (e.g., on-line music) and assumes that 
marginal product costs are low (and the same 
for each product) and that consumer valuations 
for each product are continuously distributed 
across consumers (e.g., uniformally or 
normally). Moreover, in the context of music 
or other digital goods purchases, risk aversion 
is of course not the motivating force driving 
the purchase, and the impact of risk aversion 
can safely be ignored in these contexts. Recent 
work by others in this area demonstrates the 
dominance of mixed bundling strategies over 
pure bundling and component selling strategies 
in maximizing monopoly profits (Chuang and 
Sirbu 1999; Hitt and Chen 2000). In contrast, 
the model developed in this paper addresses a 
different, but complementary, problem context. 
Specifically, the differences include the 
following: 
The model examines the use of 
bundling strategies by a regulated insurance 
company (restricted to zero profits) to 
maximize market participation at affordable 
premium rates. 
 In the context of the individual health 
insurance market marginal costs of 
insurance provision are high and vary 
discretely across insureds based on each 
insured’s risk portfolio for the covered set 
of medical conditions. Since applicants 
are generally either at high risk or at low 
risk for acquiring a specific medical 
condition, risk is discretely (as opposed to 
continuously) distributed across the 
applicant population. As a result, the 
marginal cost to the insurer of providing 
insurance coverage to an insured is the 
insured’s expected medical costs. 
 Applicants’ valuations for insurance 
coverage also vary discretely across 
applicants based on applicants’ risk 
portfolios, expected medical costs, and 
risk aversion levels.  
In this very different context we show 
that the effectiveness of alternative bundling 
strategies in achieving regulatory goals of 
maximizing market participation at affordable 
premiums depends critically on the level of 
risk aversion exhibited by applicants. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous work in insurance economics 
has acknowledged that the presence of 
information asymmetries may lead to adverse 
selection and, in the worst case, complete 
market collapse. Much of this work examined 
the use of price-quantity contracts (i.e., a form 
of rationing in which the contract specifies 
both the premium rate applicants must pay and 
the deductible for which applicants are 
responsible) to mitigate adverse selection in 
insurance markets where applicants possess 
perfect and private information about their 
propensity to incur a single specified loss 
(Riley 1979; Miyasaki 1977; Wilson 1977; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). In these models 
insurance companies typically induce 
individuals to sort themselves into risk classes 
by their choice of contracts. High risks select 
full insurance coverage at actuarially fair rates 
(calculated for the pool of high-risk 
individuals) while low risks select partial 
insurance coverage but at lower average 
premium than that of high risks. The lower 
premium for low-risk individuals reflects both 
the lower degree of coverage and the lower 
average risk of applicants. 
Other work addressed the adverse 
selection problem through risk classification – 
that is, offering different coverage levels and 
charging different premium rates to applicants 
based on observable characteristics such as 
genetic history or based on behaviors such as 
smoking (Bond and Crocker 1991; Crocker 
and Snow 1986). This work implies that 
insurance companies that are able to access 
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genetic information (e.g., via genetic testing 
and data mining tools) should engage in 
genetic discrimination. However, industry 
regulators, consumer advocates, ethicists, and 
others argue that genetic discrimination is 
unfair to applicants who have inherited a 
genetic predisposition over which they have no 
control. 
In order to avoid the perceived 
unfairness of risk classification based on 
genetic information Tabarrok (1994) proposed 
the implementation of genetic insurance. In 
this model all individuals purchase genetic 
insurance at a single premium and then 
undergo genetic screening. Their genetic 
insurance policies will pay them the expected 
increase in health insurance premiums that 
would result from the conditions detected 
during their genetic screening. The fully public 
results of their testing would then determine 
the actual cost of their health insurance in an 
efficient market. Unfortunately, genetic 
insurance would work only if participation 
could be made mandatory and universal; 
otherwise, it is prone to the same adverse 
selection problem that it is intended to correct 
in the health insurance markets. For example, 
individuals who do not observe a signal from 
their family or medical history regarding the 
presence of a genetic predisposition may find 
the genetic insurance overpriced and opt out of 
the genetic insurance market altogether. 
Although the adverse selection problem 
presented in this paper is grounded in the 
insurance economics literature, we examine the 
economic impact of alternative bundling 
strategies (as opposed to price-quality 
contracts, risk classification, or genetic 
insurance) in the context of the individual 
health insurance market. Most of the bundling 
work in the marketing and IT literatures 
examines the use of bundling strategies by 
multi-product monopolists to maximize profits, 
capture consumer surplus, and reduce 
deadweight losses. While early work focused 
on 2-good bundling (Adams and Yellen 1996; 
Salinger 1995; Schmalensee 1984), more 
recent work has examined N-good bundling 
settings. For example, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
(1999) examined the impact of bundling a 
large number of information (or digital) goods 
on the profits earned by a multi-product 
monopolist. They demonstrate that when 
marginal costs are very low, consumer 
valuations for the goods are of comparable 
value, and the correlation in demand for 
different goods is low, a multi-product 
monopolist may use a pure bundling strategy 
(i.e., selling the entire bundle of products at a 
single price) to increase profits, capture 
consumer surplus, and reduce dead weight 
losses. Chuang and Sirbu (1999) extended this 
work by developing an N-good bundling model 
to examine the optimal bundling strategy for 
publishers selling and delivering academic 
journal articles over the Internet. In this 
context they establish mixed bundling (i.e., 
offering both individual articles and journal 
subscriptions) as the dominant, profit-
maximizing strategy. Hitt and Chen (2000) 
also demonstrate the dominance of mixed 
bundling strategies in certain monopoly 
markets. Assuming that costs of individual 
goods or services are strictly greater than zero 
(but low) they show that a monopolist will earn 
more and consumer satisfaction will increase 
by allowing customers to choose a fixed subset 
of a larger set of offerings. That is, both 
monopolist record clubs and consumers will be 
better off if consumers choose their 10 favorite 
recordings for a fixed price, rather than being 
required to purchase all available selections 
under the pure bundling case. 
Thatcher (1998) and Thatcher and 
Clemons (2000) extended the bundling work to 
contexts outside of a multi-product 
monopolist. They considered a regulated 
individual health insurance market and 
examined the impact of a pure bundling 
strategy, in which the insurer offers only a 
comprehensive policy that covers a large 
number of medical conditions, on consumer 
participation in insurance markets. They found 
that if the number of conditions covered in the 
comprehensive policy is sufficiently large that 
a pure bundling strategy may reduce adverse 
selection and increase consumer participation 
in the market. This work examined the 
sensitivity of this result to a range of model 
parameters, including the number of conditions 
included in the comprehensive policy, the 
distribution of risk across the applicant 
population, and the size of the treatment costs. 
In this paper we extend this work by 
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comparing the effectiveness of alternative 
bundling strategies (including a mixed 
bundling strategy and a component selling 
strategy) on consumer participation and policy 
premiums over a range of applicant risk 
aversion. 
MODEL 
Individuals are potential consumers of (or applicants for) private health insurance products 
and services. We assume that applicants are at risk for N  insurable medical conditions, each of 
which has a genetic risk component and a known treatment cost, T . Each individual is endowed 
with either a high-risk status with probability  , where 10   , or a low-risk status with 
probability  1 , for each medical condition through a set of N  independent and identical 
Bernoulli trials. We assume a sufficiently large applicant population so that we may use the 
binomial distribution to approximate the distribution of risk types in the applicant population. 
Without loss of generality we normalize the number of potential consumers (or applicants for 
individual health insurance) in the market to 1. We define risk type h as those individuals 
endowed as high risk for h  of the N  medical conditions and, therefore, endowed as low risk for 
the remaining  hN   conditions. The proportion of the applicant population endowed as risk 














where ),,( Nhbinom  is the probability density function for the binomial distribution.  
We assume that individuals are perfectly informed, through a set of free and perfectly 
accurate genetic tests, of their risk type h . The probability that an individual at low risk for a 
condition will develop that condition (and incur the associated treatment costs) is Lp  and the 
probability that an individual at high risk for a condition will develop that condition is Hp , 
where 10  HL pp . These probabilities are fixed and not altered by individuals’ 
behaviors. Individuals are identical except in their risk type, or the number of conditions for 
which they are at high risk. In addition, individuals are risk averse and possess the same 
underlying exponential utility function  
   rexU   (2) 
where r is the risk aversion parameter and  is the applicant’s wealth. The exponential utility 
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) as defined by Arrow (1971). The 



















































  (3) 
where 0  is the initial wealth of applicants. Equation (3) calculates, for all combinations of x and 
y, the probability that risk type h will develop x of his h high risk conditions and y of his (N-h) 
low risk conditions, multiplies that probability by the utility associated with incurring the 
treatment costs for those (x+y) conditions, and sums the weighted utility calculations over all (x, 
y) combinations. This calculation generates the expected utility of risk type h remaining uninsured 
in any time period t. 
This model considers a single, risk-neutral insurance company participating in a regulated 
insurance market in which genetic privacy legislation prevents the insurer from engaging in 
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genetic discrimination, or targeting insurance policies to specific applicants based on genetic 
information. Therefore, the insurer offers a menu of policy options, specifying coverage levels 
and premium rates, from which insurance applicants may choose. We examine four menu designs 
(or bundling strategies).  
 Component Selling Strategy (CSS) – the insurer offers a selection of single disease policies to 
the market; consumers may create their own customized bundles by purchasing any 
combination of policies or purchase nothing at all.  
 Pure Bundling Strategy (PBS) – the insurer offers only a comprehensive policy to the market; 
consumers may purchase the comprehensive policy or nothing at all.  
 Mixed Bundling Strategy (MBS) – the insurer offers a comprehensive policy and a selection 
of single disease policies to the market simultaneously; consumers may purchase the 
comprehensive policy, a customized bundle of single disease policies, or nothing at all.  
 Exclusion Strategy (ES) – the insurer offers a comprehensive policy and an exclusion policy 
to the market simultaneously; consumers may purchase one of the policies or nothing at all.  
We examine the impact of each menu design on the purchasing decisions made by 
applicants, the premium rates charged by insurers, and the consumer participation realized in the 
market. In the initial period the insurer must price the policies based on population statistics. 
However, after the initial period the insurer is permitted to engage in actuarially fair re-pricing 
based on the applicants’ purchasing decisions and claims experience.  
Component Selling Strategy (CSS): Defining the Adverse Selection Problem 
Under CSS applicants may create their own customized bundle of insurance coverage by 
selecting any number of N single coverage policies, each covering a single condition at a fixed 
premium. Since genetic privacy legislation prevents the insurer from engaging in genetic 
discrimination, or targeting insurance policies to specific applicants based on genetic information, 
in the initial period the insurer must price the policies based on population statistics. Therefore, 
the initial premium charged for each of the N single-disease policies at time 0t  is 
   Tpp  P LHS   1
0
 (4) 
From the uninformed insurer’s perspective Equation (4) represents the expected claims 
experience of each applicant for each of the N medical conditions. For example, assume that 10% 
of applicants are at high risk for each medical condition (while 90% are at low risk) and that those 
applicants at high risk have a 20% chance of developing the condition while those at low risk 
have only a 5% chance of developing the condition. Also assume that an applicant who develops a 
medical condition will incur medical costs of 100. In this case, since the insurer does not have 
access to individuals’ risk status, the insurer is initially forced to engage in a uniform pricing 
strategy. Therefore, from the insurer’s perspective the expected claims experience for each 
applicant for each medical condition is 6.5.  
Given that risk (and therefore, the realization of risk) is distributed independently and 
identically across the applicant population and assuming a sufficiently large applicant pool the 
claims experience across single-disease policies will be the same. Therefore, the premiums for 
policies covering each condition will have the same distribution and the same expected value. 
When applicants enter the market they observe the menu of single-disease policies offered by the 
insurance company that period. In the initial period, based on all available information (i.e., the 
realization of their risk type, h , and the premiums, 
0
SP , charged by the insurer), expected utility 
maximizing applicants decide whether to purchase insurance or remain uninsured.  
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We assume that individuals possess a positive level of risk aversion  0r . This 
assumption implies that individuals would rather purchase insurance priced at an actuarially fair 
rate for that individual than remain uninsured; that is, 
         ],[,1 LHiTpUUpTUp iii    (A1) 
In addition, we assume that the level of risk aversion is reasonable. Specifically, we 
assume that an individual at low risk for a specific condition would prefer to remain uninsured 
than purchase insurance priced at the actuarially fair rate for the entire applicant population; that 
is, 
         UpTUpPU LLS  10  (A2) 
Together, Assumptions (A1) and (A2) limit the analysis to only ranges of positive risk 
aversion in which the adverse selection problem arises. 
In the initial period each applicant, given 
0
SP , will purchase those policies that cover 
conditions for which he is at high risk (given Assumption )1(A ) but will remain uninsured for his 
low-risk conditions (given Assumption )2(A ). Specifically, applicants of risk type h  will 
purchase a customized bundle of h  policies, each covering one of the h  high-risk conditions, 
and will remain uninsured for the  hN   low-risk conditions. Since applicants only cover their 
high-risk conditions and the insurer is permitted to re-price its menu of policies each period based 
on claims experience the equilibrium price realized under CSS for each single-disease policy is 
 T pP HS 

 (5) 
The expected utility of applicants of risk type h  of purchasing this customized bundle of 

























Consumer participation is measured as the percentage of medical conditions covered by 
insurance while market participation is measured as the percentage of outcome risk covered by 
insurance. These equilibrium values will serve as a baseline with which to compare the 
effectiveness of the pure bundling, mixed bundling, and exclusion strategies in mitigating the 
adverse selection problem. Under CSS the equilibrium level of consumer participation is  

















  (7) 
The equilibrium level of market participation is  
  






















   
0
 (8) 
where the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchase single-disease policies (or 
the amount of outcome risk covered by insurance) and the denominator is the population’s claims 
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).  
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Pure Bundling Strategy (PBS) 
Under PBS applicants are offered a comprehensive policy that covers the applicant for all 
insurable medical conditions at a single, fixed premium. Each applicant must decide whether to 
purchase the policy and become fully insured or remain uninsured. Due to genetic privacy 
legislation the initial premium charged for the comprehensive policy at time 0t  is  
   NTpp  P LHC   1
0
 (9) 
After the initial period the insurer will engage in actuarially fair pricing based on claims 
































where 11, thc  if risk type h  purchases the comprehensive policy in time  1t  and 
01, thc  if risk type h  remains uninsured. In Equation (10) the numerator is the claims 
experience of insureds who purchased the comprehensive policy in the previous time period and 
the denominator is the percentage of the population that purchased the comprehensive policy in 
the previous period (remember that we normalized the number of applicants to 1).  
Based on all available information (the realization of their risk type, h , and the premium, 
t
CP ), applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy or remain uninsured. The 
expected utility of purchasing the comprehensive policy for risk type h  in period t  is 
   0,  tP UEU tCttC   (11) 
Under PBS the level of consumer participation in time t  is  








t    (12) 
























where the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchased the comprehensive 
policy and the denominator is the population’s claims experience (or the population’s total 
outcome risk exposure). Overall, Equation (13) represents the percentage of outcome risk covered 
in the market at any time t under a PBS.  
Mixed Bundling Strategy (MBS) 
Under MBS applicants are offered a choice between a comprehensive policy and a 
selection of single disease policies. The mechanisms for pricing these policies and for calculating 
expected utilities associated with purchasing policies were presented earlier. Based on all 
available information (the realization of their risk type, h , and the premiums, 
t
CP  and 

SP ), 
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applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy, a customized bundle of single-
disease policies, or remain uninsured. Under MBS the level of consumer participation in time t  is  























t   (14) 
where 1, ths  if risk type h  purchases a customized bundle of single-disease policies covering 
high-risk conditions in time t  and 0, ths  otherwise. Note that applicants cannot over-insure 








































where the numerator is sum of the claims experience of insureds who purchased either the single-
disease policies or the comprehensive policy and the denominator is the population’s claims 
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).  
Exclusion Strategy (ES) 
Under ES applicants are offered a choice between a comprehensive policy and an 
exclusion policy. For the exclusion policy each applicant may decide which one of the N  
conditions to exclude from the policy coverage. Each applicant must decide whether to purchase 
the comprehensive policy, the exclusion policy, or remain uninsured. The mechanism for pricing 
the comprehensive policy and for calculating the expected utility associated with purchasing the 
policy was presented earlier. The initial premium charged for the exclusion policy at time 0t  
is  
    TNpp  P LHE 11
0    (16) 
After the initial period the insurer will engage in actuarially fair pricing based on claims 
experience. Therefore, the premium charged for the exclusion policy in time 0t  is 
 
       
0,











































































where 11,, tHhe  if applicants who are risk type h  purchase an exclusion policy and decide to 
omit a high-risk condition ( 01,, tHhe  otherwise) and 11,, tLhe  if applicants who are risk 
type h  purchase an exclusion policy and decide to omit a low-risk condition ( 01,, tLhe  
otherwise). Note that applicants may not over-insure such that 11,1,,1,,   thtLhtHh cee . In 
Equation (17) the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchased the exclusion 
policy in the previous time period and the denominator is the percentage of the population that 
purchased the exclusion policy in the previous period. 
Based on all available information (the realization of their risk type, h , and the premiums, 
t
CP  and 
t
EP ), applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy, the exclusion 
Bundling Economics Under Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market  
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policy, or remain uninsured. The expected utility of purchasing the exclusion policy in period t  
for an applicant of risk type h  who is endowed as high risk (H) for the omitted condition is 
       0,1,,  tPUpTPUpEU EttHEttHt HhE  . (18) 
The expected utility of purchasing the exclusion policy in period t  for an applicant of risk 
type h  who is endowed as low risk (L) for the omitted condition is  
       0,1,,  tPUpTPUpEU tEtLtEtLt LhE   (19) 
Under ES the level of consumer participation in time t  is  























t   (20) 
and the level of market participation in time t  is  
 















































  (21) 
where the numerator is sum of the claims experience of insureds who purchased either the 
comprehensive policy or the exclusion policy and the denominator is the population’s claims 
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).  
 
The Solution Mechanism 
This model is a repeated Cournot game. 
In the game theory literature models of 
repeated Cournot games assume that demand 
functions are known to all players, that each 
player knows his own cost function, and that 
after each period the players are informed 
about their own profit and the decisions made 
by other players. These assumptions are 
consistent with our model. That is, the 
distribution of risk across the population is 
publicly known to the insurer and applicants 
alike (i.e., demand functions are known), each 
applicant has perfect knowledge of his own 
risk status and insurers observe realized claims 
at the end of each period (i.e., each player 
knows his own cost function), insurers observe 
purchasing decisions made by applicants in 
each period, applicants observe re-pricing 
decisions made by insurers in each period, and 
insurer and applicants alike observe their own 
profits in each period.  
We solve for the Nash equilibrium of 
the game through iterative numerical 
computation based on the best response 
dynamic. The best response dynamic, which 
dates back to duopoly analysis by Cournot, 
assumes that players take actions that best 
respond to a competing player's last action. In 
our model applicants make purchasing 
decisions each period that best respond to the 
policy prices set by the insurer and the insurer 
makes pricing decisions each period that best 
respond, given regulatory restrictions, to 
applicants’ purchasing decisions made in the 
previous period. Through iterative numerical 
computation of the best response dynamic, we 
derive the Nash Equilibrium from the repeated 
game where the insurer will not change its 
premiums unless applicants change their 
purchasing behavior and where no applicants, 
regardless of their risk type, will change their 
purchasing decision unless the insurer changes 
its prices. We derive the Nash equilibrium in 
this way due to the discrete (non-continuous) 
distribution of risk across the applicant 
population in this problem context. Table 1 
provides an overview of the model parameters, 
decision variables, and outcome measures 
presented in this section.  
Matt Thatcher and Eric Clemons 
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Table 1. Model Parameters, Decision Variables, and Outcome Measures  
N  Number of i.i.d. medical conditions for which applicants are at risk 
T  Treatment cost for each medical condition 
  Percentage of the population at high risk for each medical condition 
h   Applicants of type h are at high risk for h  of the N  medical conditions 
h  Percent of applicants of risk type h  in the population 
Hp  
Probability an applicant at high risk will acquire a condition  
Lp  
Probability an applicant at low risk will acquire a condition  
t  Wealth of each applicant in period t 
t
CP
 Premium for the comprehensive policy in period t 
t
EP  
Premium for the exclusion policy in period t 
t
SP  
Premium for each single disease policy in period t 
thc ,  1, thc  if type h applicants purchase the comprehensive policy in period t, 
0, thc  otherwise 
tHhe ,,  1,, tHhe  if type h applicants purchase the exclusion policy and omit a high-risk 
condition in period t, 0,, tHhe  otherwise 
tLhe ,,  1,, tLhe  if type h applicants purchase the exclusion policy and omit a low-risk 
condition in period t, 0,, tLhe  otherwise 
ths ,  1, ths  if type h applicants purchase a customized bundle of single disease 
policies to cover their h high-risk conditions in period t, 0, ths  otherwise 
 xU  Utility function for applicants –   rxexU   
r  Applicant risk aversion parameter 
t
hEU
 Expected utility (EU) for type h applicants of remaining uninsured in period t 
t
CEU
 EU for applicants purchasing the comprehensive policy in period t 
t
HhEEU ,,  
EU for type h applicants at high risk for the exclusion of purchasing the exclusion 
policy in period t 
t
LhEEU ,,  
EU for type h applicants at low risk for the exclusion of purchasing the exclusion 
policy in period t 
hSEU ,  
EU for type h applicants of purchasing single disease policies to cover their high-
risk conditions 
 iCP t  Consumer participation realized under strategy  ESMBSPBSCSSi ,,,  in 
period t  
 iMP t  Market participation realized under strategy  ESMBSPBSCSSi ,,,  in period 
t  
Bundling Economics Under Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market  
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OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
Below we briefly overview the findings 
derived in the following sections. 
 (Pure Bundling): We show that insurers 
may attain universal coverage at equitable 
premiums under PBS. This result is 
strengthened as the number of medical 
conditions covered in the comprehensive 
policy increases and as applicant risk 
aversion increases.  
 (Low Risk Aversion): When insurance 
applicants exhibit low levels of risk 
aversion MBS improves consumer 
participation and decreases premium rates 
when compared to PBS. In this context 
market performance is improved by 
increasing policy options offered to 
applicants.  
 (Moderate Risk Aversion): When 
insurance applicants exhibit moderate 
levels of risk aversion MBS reduces 
consumer participation and increases 
premium rates when compared to PBS. In 
this context market performance is 
improved by reducing policy options 
offered to applicants.  
 (High Risk Aversion): When insurance 
applicants exhibit sufficiently high levels 
of risk aversion the consumer participation 
realized under PBS and MBS converge to 
full market participation. In this context 
market performance is maximized when a 
comprehensive policy is included in the 
menu design and is not affected by the 
presence of single-disease policies in the 
menu. 
 (Exclusion Strategy): Finally, under all 
levels of risk aversion we show that 
compared to PBS implementing ES 
decreases consumer participation. 
With this overview of critical findings 
in mind we present the detailed calculations of 
consumer choice under the four menu designs 
and examine the consumer participation that 
results from each as a function of risk aversion. 
Table 2 presents the initial model parameters 
used to generate the findings presented in the 
following sections. Based on these initial 
parameters the expected medical cost for an 
individual at high risk for a medical condition 
is 20 per high-risk condition and the expected 
medical cost for an individual at low-risk for a 
medical condition is 5 per low-risk condition.  
Table 2. Model Parameter Values 
T  100 





PURE BUNDLING STRATEGY (PBS) 
Figures 1a maps equilibrium consumer 
participation under PBS as a function of risk 
aversion over a range of N . This figure shows 
that the level of consumer participation 
increases with N . The intuition behind this 
result is that as the number of conditions 
covered in the comprehensive policy increases, 
individuals, who are heterogeneous in their 
risk exposure to each individual condition, 
become homogenous in their risk exposure to 
the entire bundle of conditions. That is, as N  
increases, individuals’ expected treatment 
costs associated with acquiring the N  
conditions converge to a single value, the 
average expected treatment costs for the 
population (i.e., 6.5 per condition). Therefore, 
applicants’ valuations for the comprehensive 
policy converge as well. If the number of 
conditions covered in the comprehensive 
policy is sufficiently large then a PBS 
simultaneously eliminates the adverse selection 
problem, maximizes consumer participation, 
and ensures premium equity across insureds. 
These results are accomplished without 
adversely affecting the viability of the insurer. 
We note that the convergence of applicant risk 
over large N  occurs despite the discrete 
nature of the binomial distribution, which 
underlies individuals’ risk exposure in this 
problem domain. 





































Figure 1a. Consumer Participation Under PBS. This figure compares the level of consumer 
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy 
(PBS) over different assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) as the number of 
conditions covered in the bundled coverage increases.  
Importantly, Figure 1a also shows that 
what defines a sufficiently large N  depends 
on the level of applicant risk aversion. 
Specifically, the level of consumer 
participation under PBS increases 
monotonically with risk aversion. This finding 
is not surprising since applicants with higher 
risk aversion are willing to pay a higher risk 
premium to avoid uncertain losses associated 
with medical conditions for which they are at 
risk. In fact, extremely high levels of risk 
aversion would result in an applicant buying 
coverage to protect against almost all risk and 
almost irrespective of cost.  
Proposition 1: Under PBS consumer 
participation approaches full participation 
and the premium rate for the 
comprehensive policy approaches the 
actuarially fair rate for the applicant 
population as the number of medical 
conditions covered in the comprehensive 
policy increases and as the level of 
applicant risk aversion increases.  
We note that Proposition 1 holds not 
only under the assumption that applicants are 
homogeneous in their risk aversion levels (as 
assumed thus far) but also under the 
assumption that applicants are heterogeneous 
in their risk aversion levels. For example, 
Figure 1b compares the level of consumer 
participation realized under PBS as the number 
of conditions covered in the bundled coverage 
increases under three different assumptions of 
risk aversion: 1) applicant risk aversion is 
homogenous and high, 2) applicant risk 
aversion is homogenous and moderate, and 3) 
applicant risk aversion is heterogeneous and 
uniformally distributed across the applicant 
population. Figure 1b illustrates that consumer 
participation approaches full participation 
under a PBS as the number of medical 
conditions covered in the comprehensive 
policy increases even in the presence of 
heterogeneous applicant risk aversion. 
PURE BUNDLING (PBS) VS. MIXED 
BUNDLING (MBS) VS. COMPONENT 
SELLING STRATEGY (CSS) 
Figures 2 – 5 map the equilibrium 
consumer participation realized under three 
alternative menu designs (PBS, MBS, and CSS) 
as a function of risk aversion for 
 1000,750,300,25N  assuming the 
model parameters values presented in Table 2. 
We use these figures to derive a series of 
propositions in this section. 
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Figure 1b. Consumer Participation Under PBS (Under Three Different Risk 


































Figure 2. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( 25N ). This figure compares the level of consumer 
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy 
(PBS) and a mixed bundling strategy (MBS) over different assumptions about the level of 








































Figure 3. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( 300N ). This figure compares the level of consumer 
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy 
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different 
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and 































Figure 4. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( 750N ). This figure compares the level of consumer 
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy 
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different 
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and 
therefore seek coverage for) 750 health conditions. 
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Figure 5. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( 1000N ). This figure compares the level of consumer 
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy 
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different 
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and 
therefore seek coverage for) 1000 health conditions. 




When insurance applicants exhibit low 
risk aversion CSS dominates PBS (see Figures 
2 – 5). In this context the level of consumer 
participation is improved by increasing 
consumer choice. The intuition for this result is 
straightforward. As shown earlier, under CSS 
applicants will purchase single disease policies 
to cover their high-risk conditions given any 
risk aversion level satisfying Assumptions 
(A1) and (A2), resulting in consumer 
participation of 10% and market participation 
of 30.77%. However, as shown in Figures 1 – 
5, under PBS comprehensive policies attract 
only a small number of very high-risk 
applicants while the majority of applicants opt 
out of coverage when risk aversion is low.  
Table 3 shows the market dynamics that 
generate one of the equilibrium data points that 
make up the PBS step function in Figure 4. 
Specifically, it shows the market dynamics that 
lead to market equilibrium under PBS when 
750N  and risk aversion is very low – 
0002.r . In this case equilibrium market 
participation is 3.41% and the equilibrium 
premium for the comprehensive policy is 
5,159.31 (5.8% above the actuarially fair rate – 
4,875.00 – for the population). Before 
describing the market dynamics leading to this 
equilibrium point for 750N  and 
0002.r  on Figure 4 we first define a term 
we will use to explain the dynamics. The term 
Risk-Equivalent Sub-Pool (Spool) will be used 
to refer to a sub-population of applicants that is 
homogeneous in personal riskiness (or of the 
same risk type h ). In the dynamics presented 
in Table 3 there are 756 (or 1N ) Spools 
since an applicant may be at high risk for as 
few as zero conditions and as many as 750 
conditions. 
In period 1 the spools of applicants at 
high risk for 73 or more medical conditions 
purchase the comprehensive policy while all 
other spools opt out of the market and remain 
uninsured. The expected medical cost for the 
750 conditions for applicants in spool 73 is 
4845.00 [EC = 4845]; the initial premium of 
the comprehensive policy is 4875.00, which is 
0.62% higher than the actuarially fair rate for 
the spool. Given their risk status and the slight 
but positive level of risk aversion applicants in  
Matt Thatcher and Eric Clemons 
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Table 3. Market Dynamics under PBS  0002.,750  rN  
t 
t
CP  Who Buys C? 
% of Population 
Buying C 
 PBSMP tLRA  (%) 
Claims Experience 
for C 
1 4875.00 h  73 61.39% 62.35% 3039.61 
2 4951.49 78 37.49% 38.45% 1874.54 
3 5000.36 81 24.88% 25.69% 1252.21 
4 5033.82 83 17.99% 18.66% 909.73 
5 5057.44 85 12.48% 13.00% 633.98 
6 5081.92 86 10.23% 10.69% 520.94 
7 5094.45 87 8.29% 8.69% 423.52 
8 5107.14 88 6.65% 6.99% 340.67 
9 5119.98 89 5.28% 5.56% 271.11 
10 5132.96 90 4.15% 4.38% 213.44 
11 5146.07 91 3.22% 3.41% 166.25 
12 5159.31 91 3.22% 3.41% 166.25 
 
spool 73 and higher will decide to purchase the 
comprehensive policy. Alternatively, the 
comprehensive policy premium is 0.93% 
higher than the actuarially fair rate for spool 72 
[EC = 4830]. Given their risk status and low 
level of risk aversion applicants in spool 72 
and lower will find the comprehensive policy 
too expensive and will opt out of the market 
and remain uninsured. As shown in Table 3, 
this results in market participation of 61.39% 
in Period 1. 
In period 2 the insurance company will 
raise (based on claims experience) the price of 
the comprehensive policy from 4875.00 to 
4951.49 to account for the lower risk 
applicants opting out in Period 1. This price 
increase leads spools 74 – 77 [EC = 4860, 
4875, 4890, 4905] to opt out of the market and 
become uninsured since the new higher price is 
too expensive given their risk status and low 
risk aversion. The new premium is 0.64% 
higher than the actuarially fair rate for spool 78 
[EC = 4920]. Given their risk status and slight 
risk aversion applicants in spool 78 and higher 
continue to purchase the comprehensive policy 
despite the increase in the premium. Since 
spools 74 – 77 opt out of the market, market 
participation falls from 61.39% to 37.49%. In 
period 3 the insurance company raises the 
price of the comprehensive policy to 5000.36 
leading spools 78 – 80 [EC= 4920, 4935, 
4950] to opt out of the market, further 
reducing market participation from 37.49% to 
24.88%. In period 4 the insurance company 
raises the premium (based on claims 
experience) to 5033.82 leading spools 81 and 
82 [EC = 4965, 4980] to opt out of coverage. 
As a result, market participation falls to 
17.99% in period 4. This dynamic spiral in 
which the insurance company increases the 
premium and spools drop out of the market 
continues as shown in Table 3 until period 12. 
At this point a stable equilibrium is achieved 
with spools at high risk for 91 or more medical 
conditions purchasing the comprehensive 
policy at a price of 5159.31 (5.8% above the 
actuarially fair rate for the population), 
resulting in market participation of 3.41%, 
which is approximately one-tenth of the market 
participation realized under CSS – 
  %77.30 CSSMP . The findings 
derived from Figures 2 – 5 and from the 
dynamics presented in Table 3 lead to 
Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 (Low Risk Aversion): 
   PBSMPCSSMP LRA
  : If 
insurance applicants exhibit low levels of 
risk aversion then CSS dominates (or 
generates more market participation than) 
the PBS since the market dynamics under 
the PBS result in an adverse selection 
death spiral for the comprehensive policy, 
which essentially destroys the insurance 
market. 
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Low Risk Aversion:  MBSMPLRA

 
converges to  CSSMP  
Under MBS the presence of a 
comprehensive policy may encourage a small 
number of high-risk applicants to purchase the 
comprehensive policy instead of a customized 
bundle of single-disease policies. As a result, 
consumer participation under MBS will be 
higher than that realized under CSS, but only 
very slightly; in fact, the difference in market 
performance between MBS and CSS converges 
as risk aversion decreases toward zero and is 
not discernable for low levels of risk aversion 
in Figures 2 – 5.  
Table 4 shows the market dynamics that 
generate one of the equilibrium data points that 
make up the MBS step function in Figure 4. 
Specifically, it shows the market dynamics that 
lead to market equilibrium under MBS when 
750N  and risk aversion is very low – 
0002.r . In this case equilibrium market 
participation is 30.83% (just 0.19% more than 
the equilibrium market participation realized 
under CSS –   %77.30 CSSMP ) and 
the equilibrium premium for the 
comprehensive policy is 5,310.53 (8.93% 
above the actuarially fair rate for the 
population and 2.9% above the equilibrium 
premium under PBS).  
In this case all applicants cover their 
high-risk conditions. However, a very small 
percent of applicants (those in spools 102 and 
higher) also cover their low risk conditions by 
purchasing the comprehensive policy. 
Therefore, in this case market participation 
under MBS is slightly higher than under CSS. 
However, as risk aversion tends toward zero 
the market performances under MBS and CSS 
converge to   %77.30 CSSMP . The 
market dynamics leading to equilibrium under
Table 4. Market Dynamics under MBS  0002.,750  rN  
t 
t
CP  Who Buys C? 
% of Population 
Buying C 
 MBSMP tLRA  (%) 
Claims Experience 
for C 
1 4875.00 h  73 61.39% 72.95% 3039.61 
2 4951.49 79 37.49% 56.40% 1874.54 
3 5000.36 82 21.26% 45.24% 1072.83 
4 5045.51 85 12.48% 39.23% 633.98 
5 5081.92 87 8.29% 36.38% 423.52 
6 5107.14 89 5.28% 34.33% 271.11 
7 5132.96 91 3.22% 32.94% 166.25 
8 5159.31 92 2.48% 32.43% 128.11 
9 5172.65 93 1.88% 32.03% 97.66 
10 5186.09 94 1.42% 31.72% 73.65 
11 5199.62 95 1.05% 31.47% 54.95 
12 5213.25 96 0.78% 31.29% 40.57 
13 5226.95 97 0.57% 31.15% 29.63 
14 5240.72 98 0.41% 31.04% 21.41 
15 5254.56 99 0.29% 30.96% 15.31 
16 5268.47 100 0.21% 30.91% 10.83 
17 5282.43 101 0.14% 30.86% 7.58 
18 5296.45 102 0.10% 30.83% 5.25 
19 5310.51 102 0.10% 30.83% 5.25 
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MBS when given 750N  and 0002.r  
are presented in Table 4 and summarized 
below.  
In period 1 the spools of applicants at 
high risk for 73 or more medical conditions 
purchase the comprehensive policy (as was the 
case in period 1 under PBS) while all other 
lower-risk spools purchase customized bundles 
of single-disease policies to cover their high 
risk conditions (instead of remaining 
completely uninsured). This results in market 
participation of 72.95%. In period 2 applicants 
may either buy the comprehensive policy for 
4951.49, buy a customized bundle of single-
disease policies for 20/condition covered, or 
remain completely uninsured. Spools 73 – 77, 
which opted out of the comprehensive policy 
under PBS, will do the same under MBS but 
will cover their high-risk conditions with 
single-disease policies. As shown in Table 3, 
under PBS, assuming a little risk aversion 
spool 78 [EC = 4920] would prefer to purchase 
the comprehensive policy for 4951.49 rather 
than remain completely uninsured. However, 
under MBS applicants in spool 78 would prefer 
to opt out of comprehensive coverage and 
instead cover their 78 high-risk conditions for 
1560.00 (which is the EC associated with those 
78 conditions) and remain uninsured for the 








  . In total, 
spools 73 – 78 decide to purchase single-
disease policies instead of the comprehensive 
policy, leading to a reduction in market 
participation from 72.95% to 56.40%. 
In period 3 the insurance company 
raises the premium for the comprehensive 
policy to 5000.36 based on claims experience. 
In response applicants in spools 79 – 81 decide 
to opt out of the comprehensive policy and 
instead decide to purchase the customized 
bundle of single-disease policies. This dynamic 
spiral in which the insurance company 
increases the premium of the comprehensive 
policy and spools drop out of comprehensive 
coverage and into single-disease coverages 
continues until period 19, as shown in Table 4. 
At this point a stable equilibrium is achieved 
with spools at high risk for 102 or more 
medical conditions purchasing the 
comprehensive policy at a price of 5310.51 
(approximately 8.9% above the actuarially fair 
rate for the population and 2.9% above the 
equilibrium premium realized under PBS), 
resulting in market participation of 
approximately 30.83%, which is about 0.19% 
higher that the equilibrium market 
participation realized under CSS. The findings 
derived from Figures 2 – 5 and from the 
market dynamics presented in Table 4 lead to 
Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 (Low Risk Aversion): 
     PBSMPCSSMPMBSMP LRALRA
 
If insurance applicants exhibit low levels 
of risk aversion then: 
(i) MBS dominates CSS in terms of 
market participation, but just slightly. 
As risk aversion decreases to zero, the 
market dynamics under MBS result in 
an adverse selection death spiral for 
the comprehensive policy; as a result 
the market participation under MBS 
and CSS converge to  CSSMP . 
(ii) given Propositions 2 and 3(i), both 
MBS and CSS dominate PBS.  
Moderate Risk Aversion:  PBSMPMRA

 
dominates  CSSMP  
When insurance applicants exhibit 
moderate risk aversion PBS dominates CSS 
(see Figures 2 – 5) – that is, unlike the case 
under low risk aversion, the level of consumer 
participation is improved by decreasing 
consumer choice. As shown in Figure 1, as risk 
aversion increases a growing number of 
applicants prefer comprehensive coverage to 
remaining uninsured. As risk aversion becomes 
sufficiently high equilibrium consumer 
participation realized under PBS will surpass 
that realized under CSS. 






When insurance applicants exhibit 
moderate risk aversion PBS dominates MBS 
(see Figures 2 – 5) – that is, unlike the case 
under low risk aversion, the level of consumer 
participation is improved by reducing 
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consumer choice. Some applicants with a 
lower-risk portfolio of conditions who would 
purchase the comprehensive policy under PBS 
(instead of remaining uninsured) opt out of 
comprehensive coverage under MBS to 
purchase a customized bundle of single-disease 
policies. This leads not only to a reduction in 
consumer participation but also an increase in 
the premium paid by applicants that continue 
to purchase the comprehensive policy and an 
increase in the average premium paid per 
covered condition. 
Tables 5 (6) show the market dynamics 
that generate one of the equilibrium data points 
that make up the PBS (MBS) step function in 
Figure 4. Specifically, these tables show the 
market dynamics that lead to market 
equilibrium under PBS and MBS when 
750N  and risk aversion is moderate – 
00095.r . In this case, equilibrium market 
participation under PBS (94.18%) is higher 
than realized under MBS (89.42%). In 
addition, the premium for the comprehensive 
policy under PBS (4890.47) is lower than that 
realized under MBS (4908.26). Since in this 
case market equilibrium is realized very 
quickly, we do not provide a detailed 
explanation of the market dynamics presented 
in Tables 5 and 6. 
The findings lead to Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 (Moderate Risk Aversion): 
     CSSMPMBSMPPBSMP MRAMRA
 
If insurance applicants exhibit moderate 
levels of risk aversion then:  
(i) PBS dominates MBS in terms of 
market participation and 
comprehensive policy premium rates. 
That is, under MBS some applicants 
who would choose to purchase the 
comprehensive policy rather than 
remain completely uninsured decide 
to opt out of comprehensive coverage 
to purchase a customized bundle of 
single disease policies. 
(ii) both PBS and MBS dominate CSS. 
That is, given moderate levels of risk 
aversion the market dynamics under 
PBS and MBS do not degenerate into 
a death spiral for the comprehensive 
policy as was the case when risk 
aversion was assumed to be low. 
High Risk Aversion:  MBSMPHRA

 
converges to  PBSMPHRA

 
When insurance applicants exhibit 
sufficiently high risk aversion the level of 
consumer participation under MBS converges 
to that under PBS (see Figures 4 and 5). In 
fact, when risk aversion is sufficiently high for 
a given (sufficiently high) N then market 
Table 5. Market Dynamics under PBS  00095.,750  rN  
t 
t
CP  Who Buys C? 
% of Population 
Buying C 
 PBSMP tMRA  (%) 
Claims Experience 
for C 
1 4875.00 h  62 95.29% 95.53% 4657.27 
2 4887.37 63 93.88% 94.18% 4591.39 
3 4890.47 63 93.88% 94.18% 4591.39 
Table 6. Market Dynamics under MBS  00095.,750  rN  
t 
t
CP  Who Buys C? 
% of Population 
Buying C 
 MBSMP tLRA  (%) 
Claims Experience 
for C 
1 4875.00 h  65 90.14% 93.03% 4415.23 
2 4898.26 67 84.99% 89.42% 4171.75 
3 4908.26 67 84.99% 89.42% 4171.75 
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participation under both strategies converges 
to full market participation. In this case 
consumers will prefer to purchase 
comprehensive coverage to protect themselves 
against the potential expense associated with 
even those conditions for which they know 
themselves to be low risk. That is, adding the 
alternative option to purchase single coverage 
instead of comprehensive coverage will attract 
fewer and fewer applicants as risk aversion 
increases (given risk aversion is sufficiently 
high). Of course, since market participation 
converges to full market participation under 
PBS and MBS, both strategies still dominate 
CSS. This leads to Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5 (High Risk Aversion): 
     CSSMPMBSMPPBSMP HRAHRA
 
If insurance applicants exhibit high levels 
of risk aversion then:  
(i) PBS dominates MBS in terms of 
market participation, but just slightly. 
As risk aversion increases to very 
high levels, the market participation 
under PBS and MBS converge toward 
full market participation. That is, in 
this case the presence of single-
disease policies in the menu does not 
affect consumers’ purchasing 
decisions.  
(ii) Consistent with the case of moderate 
levels of risk aversion PBS and MBS 
dominate CSS. That is, the market 
dynamics do not degenerate into a 
death spiral for the comprehensive 
policy. 
All Risk Aversion Levels:  PBSMP  
dominates  ESMP  
Under ES applicants are faced with a 
choice between a comprehensive policy and a 
customized exclusion policy in which the 
applicant may choose the condition to be 
omitted from coverage. In this case all 
applicants who would purchase a 
comprehensive policy under PBS will, under 
ES, choose to purchase the exclusion policy 
instead and will choose to exclude a low-risk 
condition. This migration of insureds from the 
comprehensive policy to the exclusion policy 
leads to a decrease in consumer participation. 
In this case increasing the policy options 
offered to the market (i.e., offering an 
exclusion policy in addition to the 
comprehensive policy) results in applicants 
receiving less coverage. 
Proposition 6 (All Levels of Risk 
Aversion):    ESMPPBSMP   : 
The pure bundling strategy dominates the 
exclusion strategy in terms of market 
participation over all levels of risk 
aversion. 
Summary of Critical Findings 
Table 7 summarizes the critical findings 
presented in this section. 
We have shown that in markets where 
consumers exhibit sufficiently low levels of 
risk aversion, maximizing the policy options 
available for individual choice improves 
market participation. If the insurance company 
is forced by regulators to offer only 
comprehensive policies, virtually all applicants 
will chose to remain uninsured as risk aversion 
goes to zero. However, for slightly positive 
levels of risk aversion a vanishingly small 
group of applicants at greatest overall risk will 
choose to purchase a comprehensive policy.  
Table 7. Summary of Findings 
Risk Aversion Level Market Efficiency Ordering 
Low Risk Aversion 
(r = .0002) 
     PBSMPCSSMPMBSMP LRALRA
   
Moderate Risk Aversion (r = 
.00095) 
     CSSMPMBSMPPBSMP MRAMRA
   
High Risk Aversion  
(r = .002) 
     CSSMPMBSMPPBSMP HRAHRA
   
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In markets where consumers exhibit 
moderate levels of risk aversion, minimizing 
the options available for individual choice 
improves market participation. That is, 
offering comprehensive policies improves 
market participation relative to that achieved 
by offering a selection of single-disease 
coverage policies. In fact, if the insurance 
company is forced by regulators to offer a 
selection of single-disease policies along with 
the comprehensive policy some applicants, 
who would purchase comprehensive coverage 
rather than remain completely uninsured, will 
decide to opt out of the comprehensive policy 
in favor of a customized bundle of single-
disease policies. This increased set of choices 
results in a decrease in consumer participation 
and an increase in the premium charged for the 
comprehensive policy.  
Alternatively, in markets where 
consumers exhibit a high degree of risk 
aversion, increasing consumer choice by 
offering a selection of single-disease policies 
along with the comprehensive policy does not 
adversely affect market participation. Finally, 
we show that offering an exclusion policy 
reduces market participation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses a parsimonious model 
to examine the theoretical relationships among 
alternative bundling strategies, risk aversion, 
and market performance in the individual 
health insurance market. We note that there are 
limitations to the policy-relevance of these 
findings to the individual health insurance 
market since, as with any theoretical exercise, 
many assumptions were made. We have 
modeled a market where risk is identically and 
independently distributed across the applicant 
population, applicants possess private and 
perfect information regarding their risk status 
for a portfolio of medical conditions, 
applicants are identical except in their risk 
status, the treatments costs across conditions 
and applicants are identical, fixed, and known 
to applicants, and the form of applicant utility 
function is exponential.  
Although our model is simplified, it is 
sufficiently robust for our analysis to make a 
significant contribution to our understanding of 
the economics of bundling in a context not 
explored in previous work. Specifically, 
previous work has focused on the use of 
bundling strategies by multiple-product 
monopolists to maximize profits and generally 
assumes that marginal product costs are low 
and that consumer product valuations are 
distributed continuously across consumers. 
Alternatively, the model developed in this 
paper examined the use of bundling strategies 
by a regulated insurance company (restricted 
to zero profits) to maximize consumer 
participation at affordable premium rates. In 
this context marginal product costs are high 
and vary discretely across insureds based on 
each insureds’ risk portfolio for the covered set 
of medical conditions. Applicants’ valuations 
for insurance coverage also vary discretely 
across applicants based on applicants’ risk 
portfolio and risk aversion. In this very 
different context we show that the 
effectiveness of alternative bundling strategies 
in achieving regulatory goals of improving 
market participation at affordable premiums 
critically depends on the level of risk aversion 
exhibited by applicants. 
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